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has been the center for these movements and their presence has been felt in Malaysia, 
Singapore, Brunei, Thailand and Philippines. Some of them have been active in propagating 
the new concept of jihad. Therefore, this article maps out the conception of jihad as it is 
propounded by the three movements. It discusses how the conception of these movements 
of jihad has departed from the earlier salafi movements. In addition, it discusses how the 
idea has been expanded from Indonesia to other parts of the Southeast Asian archipelago. 
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Introduction 
Studies on jihad as concept, ideology, and forces of political mobility 
have earned a wide coverage in the academia1 since the rise of the political 
Islam worldwide.2 Furthermore, there were also Western scholars who 
attempted to thoroughly study the concept, and yet the majority of them 
appear to have had a bias understanding, viewing the concept as a threat 
to Western security and civilization.3 It can be argued however that there 
is no single notion of the concept of jihad, even among Muslim scholars. 
For the Muslim scholars, debates on the jihadi concept can be divided 
between the so-called reformists and classicists.4 For classicists, the 
fundamental meaning of jihad is that of a holy physical fighting, which 
entails being in the offensive, and represents a non-negotiable concept, 
yet for the Muslim reformists, the character of jihad in its sense of fighting 
or struggle, should be viewed defensive in nature. 
The emergence of Taliban, al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State (IS) 
has witnessed the rise in importance of the concept of jihad. Al-Qaeda’s 
conceptualisation of jihad has given emphasis on the qital’s offensive 
notion of the concept. Jihad is seen as an armed struggle against the 
Western domination and its representatives, especially the United States. 
The September 11 incidents were the culmination of al-Qaeda’s 
determination of holy war against the political deprivation. The jihad of 
the Islamic State is no different from that of al-Qaeda’s, but its execution 
of the concept seems to be more lethal and rigidly dogmatic. 
In Southeast Asia, calls for jihad against Western political 
discrimination have become more vocal ever since the 2002 Bali Bombing 
incidents. It cannot be denied that jihad has always been at the forefront in 
the struggle of the separatist movements in the region, i.e. through Moro 
Islamic Liberation Movements (MILF) of the Philippines, and other 
Muslim-based separatist movements. But it was the Bali Bombings and the 
ethno-religious conflicts in various parts of Indonesia that have brought 
up the concept of jihad to its prominence. The salafi radical movements 
seem to offer a new conceptualisation of jihadi ideas to the region. 
This article seeks to map out the conception of jihad as being 
propounded by three regional salafi movements - Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), 
Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), and Hizbut Tahrir (HT). These movements 
that are active in Indonesia have made the presence of the concept felt in 
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Thailand and Philippines. Some of them have 
been active in propagating the new concept of jihad. The article, hence 
seeks to understand how these movements’ conception of jihad has 
departed from the earlier salafi movements. In addition, it also seeks to 
answer how the idea has been expanded from Indonesia to other 
Nusantara archipelago. 
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The Salafi’s Jihad 
Jihad, as a concept, has various meanings. Epistemologically, jihad 
generally means to strive in a struggle (by whatever forms).5 Conceptually, 
it seeks every Muslim community to use one's ability and power by 
exerting oneself spiritually in the way of Allah and by doing one's best to 
preach the message of Islam to others. Hence, it has developed into a 
concept of strong resistance that can come in the form of inner 
spirituality, motivation and physical strength through political mobility.6 
Hassan al-Banna of the Muslims Brotherhood movement in Egypt 
points out that every Muslim has the obligation for jihad, given that the 
order comes from Allah (God). In the fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence),  jihad is 
interpreted in two ways: firstly, as personal and a community struggle 
against injustice. According to Fazlul Karim, jihad strives to exert 
on one’s power in repelling enemy to the extent 
of one’s ability whether by word or deed. It also 
means a war undertaken for a just cause and for  
[the] defense of Islam.7 
Hence, it can be understood that one’s struggle can be in oral form, in 
writing or even by the use of force. But the key nature of the concept calls 
for hard work and strong endeavor to achieve one’s personal goal or 
objective. Secondly, it is also interpreted as a physical war against the 
infidels, the enemies and against discrimination. Thus, the element of qital 
(physical war) is part and parcel of this understanding of the jihad. The call 
to raise arms against the enemy is considered jihad Fisabililah (a war for the 
sake of Islam or God). Jihad of this nature can be found in many verses of 
the Holy Quran such as in al-Baqarah (verses 216, 193, 190, 224), al-Nisa’ 
(verse 193) and al-Taubah (verse 14). In general, these verses call Muslims 
to uphold the sanctity of Islam. Muslims are even promised with jannah 
(highest level of paradise) in the after-life if they are willing to sacrifice 
their life. 
According to some Muslim scholars or ulama, there are various levels 
of jihad, namely Jihad an-nafs (jihad against one’s self), Jihad ash-Shaytan 
(jihad against Satan), jihad against the munafiqin (hypocrites) and kuffar 
(disbelievers), and jihad against oppressing and unjust leaders.8 None of 
these are ignored nor evaded. Furthermore, Enizer and Wildan argue that 
there are various forms of jihad.9 The first form of jihad is to deliver and to 
preach Islam to the unbelievers. The second form is through waging a 
physical war against confrontational and intimidating enemies. The third 
form of jihad is a task to deliver true meaning of Islam to oppressed 
leaders, and finally, jihad can also be referred to as one’s dedication and 
commitment to the welfare of his/her parents. 
Although the majority of Muslim scholars argue that jihad should be 
interpreted in a wider context, it is the jihad fisabillah of physical wars 
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against enemies and non-Muslims that has got its prominence globally - 
either in a negative or positive way. It has been used for political 
mobilising in countries with a Muslim majority. It has conjured up an idea 
of offensive and holy war against not only the infidels but also against 
major powers, particularly the United States, seen as the great enemy of 
Islam in the world.10 
Yet, among Muslim communities, the concept of jihad has also invited 
various interpretations and heated debates. The salafis are among them. 
The term salafi here refers to Muslims or Muslim movements that espouse 
the idea of using earliest Muslims as precedence or example of the current 
Islamic practices.11 The salafi emphasizes on basic or fundamental 
teachings of Islam. In the western writings, they are always being referred 
to as the fundamentalists, militants or radicals. But Muslim scholars tend 
to disagree with the term since it connotes the idea of radicalism, 
militancy and negativities. Not all salafis are militants or radicals. There 
are also salafis that are accommodative or moderate.  
The philosophy of Salafism has, to some extent, influenced the 
thinking and Islamic understanding in Malaysia and Indonesia since the 
early 20th century. The influence exists in different forms – neo-Salafi, 
classical Salafi, radical Salafi or moderate Salafi movement – to describe 
the degree adherence to the salafi philosophy. The neo-Salafi variety is 
more home-grown and adaptable to the local political environment 
although the idea to create Daulah Islamiyah is the basic foundation of the 
Salafi movement. To neo-Salafi, their objective can be achieved through 
participation in the mainstream political process like elections, whereas, 
radical salafi is closely associated with the political philosophy of 
Wahabbism, which has made its appeal to the Kumpulan Mujahidin 
Malaysia (KMM), JI, Lasykar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Jamaah Ikhwah al-Muslimin Indonesia and 
Indonesia’s HT.12 Wahabbism is a sect within Salafism that is attributed to 
the 18th century Saudi Islamic scholar, Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab 
who stressed on Tauwhid (the oneness of God). KMM’s and JI’s Wahabbism 
of black and white Islam has inevitably created prejudices about the 
religion and its followers, especially in the aftermath of the September 11 
incidents. Consequently, the most common prejudgment created by JI’s, 
JAT’s or JI’s Wahabbism is that Islam condones the practice of jihad. 
Debates on jihad among the Salafi movements have centered not only 
on the meanings but also more importantly on questions of justifying the 
jihadi action. The two main streams of argument on the justification 
aspect of jihad are between the “radical Salafi” (sometimes referred to as 
the fundamentalists) and a more “traditional Salafi” (sometimes referred 
to as the moderate Salafi). Although conceptually it is debatable to identify 
who the radical Salafi are, this article rests its definition on these major 
characteristics, 
1. The text in the holy Quran and hadith (the saying and deeds of the 
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Prophet Mohammad) are usually literally interpreted with one-sided 
approach. The method of interpretation of the holy verses ignores the 
historical circumstances surrounding it, hence, ‘allows the possibility to be 
more advanced and dynamic interpreted to be suited with age 
advancement, without leaving its basic principles”. In such literal 
interpretation, the contemporary world is seen as “not being Islam”.13 
2. Strong advocate on the inseparability of personal religious (private 
domains) and public life (and state domain). Islam is seen as ad deen (way 
of life encompasses every domain of human society) and reject the notion 
of secularism.  
3. Rejection of the concept of religious freedom based on Western 
perspective. The group abhors religious conversion from Islam to other 
religions and would take consequently legal sanction for those who violate 
it. 
4. Jihad is considered the sixth pillar of Islamic belief.14 
5. Sharia law is the highest legal system yet how it is achieved can 
vary from a soft approach (through propagation and education) to a use of 
force.15 
On the notion of jihad, the radical salafis rest their arguments on 
various verses (mentioned earlier) in the Holy. But their justification 
should also be understood under the current context of international 
affairs. The radical Salafi movements in general have been frustrated with 
what they consider to be injustices against the Muslims. The inability of 
leading Muslim communities or countries to respond to the injustice 
which is considered to be done against them further infuriates them. 
Hence it is not surprising that a call for jihad has been a phenomenal 
development in the global scene.  
Yet the call is not new. The development has been in tandem with the 
rise of Islam since the advent of the Iranian revolution in 1978. The 
revolutions and the subsequently Islamic revivalism have provided an 
ideal platform for the radical Salafi movements to exert their ideology and 
belief among the Muslim community worldwide. Since the Iranian 
revolution, Islam seems to play a vital role as a catalyst for the expression 
of frustrations of those who represent the marginal mass.16 In 1981, for 
instance, Abd al-Salam Faraj, an Egyptian pro-Salafi author wrote in his 
book entitled The Neglected Duty,  
Is it not high time for Muslims to Act?’ God asks 
indigently. How much more impatient he must be 
after fourteen centuries! Muslims must, therefore, 
make ‘every conceivable effort’ to do God’s will. 
They must not be like the previous generations, 
who imagined that they could establish an Islamic 
state by peaceful, nonviolent means. The only way 
was by jihad, a holy war.17 
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Although the call for jihad was a reflection of his frustration against 
the Egyptian regime, it has transcended the geographical boundaries. He 
was perturbed by the Muslim leaders’ indifferent attitudes towards the 
problems faced by Palestinians. Hence he saw no other alternatives but to 
mobilize the Muslims politically by using jihad as a tool. Faraj used various 
verses from the Quran to justify his call for militant jihad and among 
others quoted a verse from the Quran, which states “Slay those who 
ascribe divinity to aught beside God wherever you may come upon them 
and take them captive, and besiege them and lie in wait for them in every 
conceivable place”.18 
The verse in al-Tauba has become the point of reference for all 
contemporary radical Salafi movements to justify their actions. For Ayman 
Al Zawahiri and Osama Ben Laden, the two most prominent leaders of al-
Qaeda, the verse paves the way for jihad to be interpreted beyond 
anything. Zawahiri’s book, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, which 
outlining al-Qaeda’s ideology, used jihad as unity goal for all radical Salafi 
movements across the continents. Jihad has been used as universal values 
against the infidels of the Western world.19 Furthermore, he labeled the 
West “not only an infidel but also a hypocrite and a liar” and argued that 
“the principles that it brags about are exclusive to, and the personal 
property of its people alone…they are not to be shared by the peoples of 
Islam, at least nothing more than what a master leaves his slave in terms 
of food crumbs”.20 He was actually referring to the Western powers that 
have been perceived to give undivided support towards the creation of the 
Israeli state. Hence, he believes that the issue has “no solution without 
jihad”.21  
Ben Laden and his associates singled out the United States and its 
allies as the major target of their jihadi campaign. Ben Laden reasoned 
that the “crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear 
declaration of war on Allah, his Messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have 
throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an 
individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries”.22 Hence 
Muslims were compelled to rise against the major power through 
whatever means such as suicide bombings and terror acts. They were 
promised with martyrdom and eternal paradise in the name of jihad. 
Although the holy Quran clearly states that suicide is a cause for eternal 
damnation, Ben Laden’s powerful image of Islam by using religion as a 
means of justifying their actions, had succeeded in gaining public support 
and aid. Pipes argues that Ben Laden and al Zawahiri have taken the 
concept of jihad outside its normal meaning and transformed it essentially 
into the sixth pillar of Islam.23 For radical salafis, it is not about religion; it 
is simply about using religion as an ends and means to achieve political 
objectives. 
It can be argued that radical salafis’ central issue is not about jihad but 
about mobilizing Muslims through jihad. Their efforts, furthermore, have 
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been fuelled by political frustrations and by the antagonism with the 
secular West. Calling for jihad is then a political avenue to garner mass 
support worldwide. At the same time, the radical Salafi also opine that 
“people’s tendency to return to religion increases when they are situated 
in critical situation.”24 This means that the frustration they are suffering 
has the potential to become a ’partner’ for radical Salafi movements that 
act in the name of Islam.25 This also explains the rise of radical Salafi 
movements all over the world with the message of offensive jihad. 
The contemporary Muslim reformists such as Hassan al-Banna, al-
Maududi, Mirza Tahir Ahmad and others have argued that the radical 
salafis’ justification for jihad  is merely an extended version of the Muslim 
classicists’ viewpoint of the early period of Islam.26 It is basically 
inapplicable to the contemporary world system. Radical salafis’ and 
Classicists’ interpretation of the Quran and hadith regarding the matter are 
sometimes misleading and out of context. Therefore, some radical salafis’ 
and classicists’ justification of jihad have been modified and overhauled by 
Muslim reformists so that the justification appears to be relevant to the 
modern international system. Some reformist intellectuals’ justification of 
jihad has even departed from that of the traditional argument by asserting 
that ijtihad (independent judgment of the Islamic law) should be 
reclaimed. 
The reformists have given three conditions under which jihad is 
permissible.27 One is that jihad against non-Muslim or non-believers are 
justified only for defensive purposes. The reformists argue that the Quran 
has no instruction to fight against non-Muslims or non-believers 
unconditionally. As Mutahhari asserts, when “they [non-Muslims] attack 
us, [sic] thus we fight them”. This assertion is based on verse in al-Baqarah: 
191-192: “And fight them until persecution no more and religion is for 
Allah. But, if they desist, then let there no more hostility except against 
wrongdoers”.28 
Except for its religious determination, the assertion is in the line with 
the modern commitment of interstate relations in recognizing the 
sovereignty of individual countries. A state has the right to protect its 
territory, population, sovereignty, and dignity from outside intrusion. 
Islam, as can be inferred from several verses in the Quran, insists on peace 
as the main pattern for inter-state relation.29 It is noteworthy, according 
to reformists, that the Charter of the United Nations reflects the same idea 
but in a different way.30 
The second condition of the reformists’ justification - to prevent 
oppression of Muslims outside the territory of Islam - does not necessarily 
mean that an adversary has to be a physical threat to Muslims. Jihad is also 
justified when other Muslim groups are oppressed and unjustly treated. 
The interesting point here is that some Shi’ite reformists contend that 
oppressed people do not necessarily have to be Muslims.31 But, the 
immediate obligation is to help oppressed Muslims. Muslims in other parts 
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of the world are guilty, according to the Shi’ite reformist interpretation, of 
allowing and supporting an aggressor’s oppression if they fail to help the 
victims.  The request for help is not needed. Rendering help to these 
oppressed Muslims is mandatory. However, as for rendering help to non-
Muslims, Shi’ite reformists tend to suggest that the help is mandatory 
when the oppressor “has positioned a people in a vacuum and blocks the 
call of Islam”.32 
Finally for reformists, jihad is only justified when an enemy breached 
a peace pledge with Muslims.33 But, Ghunaimi argues that this justification 
is practically irrelevant to the current world situation. There are hardly 
any instances in contemporary international politics of a Muslim country 
attacking its neighbour or other countries because of a failure to conform 
to a treaty.  In fact, any acts that involve physical harm to another country 
can spur the involvement of an allied country.34 For Muhammad 
Hamidullah another Muslim reformist thinker, in addition to the three 
conditions, jihad is justifiable in order to command the good and to 
prevent the commission of evil.  Unfortunately, he fails to elaborate on 
what the word ‘evil’ means in relation to the notion of jihad.  The problem 
with his argument is that “it [justification of jihad] can be interpreted in 
such a way as to include that [sic] which can [sic] hardly be considered 
defensive as this is commonly understood”.35 In other words, his 
justification of jihad is too vague.  
The appearance of the defensive character in the reformists’ 
justification of jihad - as in the sense of fighting or struggle - at the turn of 
this century stemmed, to some extent, from the influence of western 
domination and the period of colonialism. Modern reformed Muslim 
thinkers have realized that the rigidity of the application of jihad should 
be altered so that it will suit contemporary international relations. 
Moreover, some of these reformists have either been exposed to Western 
ideas or have graduated from Western universities and this has influenced 
their writings and thought. They have consequently tried to reconcile 
Western and Islamic ideas. Unlike their predecessors, therefore, their 
language on jihad justification tends to be moderate. 36 They assert that 
Islam has long ago justified jihad as an instrument for defense. Fighting, 
they argue, should not be commenced because of one’s ideology or 
disbelief in Islamic teaching.  Freedom of religions is therefore 
guaranteed. Jihad is only justified when Muslims are being attacked by 
intruders. They realize that the political importance of jihad has 
undergone changes in its justification to suit the changing circumstances 
of life, further scrutiny and analyses have suggested that modern 
justification of jihad does not totally depart from that of the classical 
viewpoint. However, the reformists emphasis on ‘defense’ as the prime 
justificatory principle for jihad is not merely an apologia for weakness and 
failure to live up to a doctrine, but it intends to be seen as a process of 
evolution dictated by Islam’s interests and changing social condition.37 
Kamarulnizam Abdullah, Mohd Afandi Salleh Conceptualizing Jihad 
 
Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, vol. 14, issue 42 (Winter 2015)  11 
 
 
The Anatomy of Southeast Asia’s Radical Salafi Movements 
Southeast Asia has been the host for various locally and 
internationally based Salafi movements. It ranges from groups with very 
inward looking peculiarities wanting to only cleanse its members’ spiritual 
ability such as the Jamaah al-Tabligh and Al-Arqam, to politically inclined 
movements such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Jama’ah Anshorut 
Tauhid (JAT), al-Maunah, Hizbut Tahrir (HT) and the infamous Jamaah 
Islamiyah (JI). They have the jihadi objectives of bringing back the pristine 
notion of Islamic values and norms. Islamic sharia (law) is deemed to be 
the highest law on the land but the mechanisms to achieve its objectives 
may be different. The following section will discuss three selected radical 
Salafi movements, namely JI, Jamaah Asharut Tawhid, and Hizbut Tahrir 
that have made headlines all over the world. The section discusses their 
evolution and their concept of jihad.  
1. Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) 
Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) was established by two Indonesian clergies, Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, who were evading prosecution in 
their country during the Soeharto period. They went to Malaysia to pursue 
their jihadi dreams by recruiting locals and expanding their networks 
throughout the region. The movement was associated with terrorism and 
labelled as a threat to the Southeast regional stability, being accused of a 
series of bombings and planned attacks on strategic locations in regions 
such as in Bali (2002 and 2005), the J. W. Marriot Hotel, Jakarta (2003), the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta (2004) and a number of other incidents in 
Indonesia and the region.38 The movement was also held responsible for its 
planned attacks on American and Israeli interests in Singapore.39 The JI-
style bombing on the J. W. Marriot and Ritz Carlton Hotels in Jakarta on 
July 17, 2009 raised speculations that the movement would continue to 
strike against Western interest in the region.40 
Ba’asyir’s imprisonment for his indirect involvement in various 
bombing incidents was considered to be the turning point of the 
movement. The movement eventually fell apart when all of its important 
leaders such as Azhari Hussin, Nordin Mat Top, Hambali, and Dulmatin 
were either killed or caught by the Indonesian or regional authorities. 
The clandestine character of JI has made it difficult to understand the 
real nature of the movement, but analysts concur that it was loosely 
organized. Even the evolution of the movement has invited several 
versions of interpretation. But the widely accepted version is that the 
movement was indeed founded by Sungkar together with Ba’asyir in the 
early 1970s. Furthermore, the genesis of JI was closely associated with 
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Indonesia’s Darul Islam (DI) groups. Both movements shared the same 
aspiration of creating a jamaah (community) that would propel Indonesia 
into an Islamic state that subscribes to the basic Islamic tenets based on 
the Koran and Hadith (the sayings of Prophet Muhammad).  
JI expanded and established cells mainly in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Australia and Singapore.41 JI’s regional command structure was divided 
into four. Singapore and the Peninsular Malaysia were under Mantiqi I 
(Ulla), whereas the major parts of Indonesia were placed under Mantiqi II 
(Sani). Mantiqi III (Thalid) covered Mindanao, Sabah, Kalimantan and 
Sulawesi and Mantiqi IV (Rabiah) covered Australia and probably Papua. 
The Malaysia and Singapore JI was headed by Riduan Isamuddin @ 
Nurjaman or better known as Hambali. 
The immediate objective of JI was to establish Daulah Islamiyah 
(Islamic state) in the region by using force, based on the concept of Solifus 
Salleh. The Daulah Islamiyah covered Malaysia, Indonesia, and Southern 
Philippines. Singapore and Brunei would eventually follow. It shared Al-
Qaeda’s anti-West sentiment, thus making it a proxy for attacks against 
Western and United States interests in the region. 
The concept of solifus salleh, furthermore, emphasizes on the pristine 
and purity of the Seventh Century Islam as it was subscribed by the 
prophet and his followers (the salafs). One of the major creeds in this 
concept is its rejection of ijma` (scholarly consensus) and qiyas (analogy) 
and also its rejection of the sources and methodological foundations of 
ijtihad (deriving qualified judgment) and taqlid (following qualified 
judgment).42 Its departure from the mainstream Salafism became distinct 
when it started condemning and declaring the umma (Muslim Community) 
as unbelievers for their practice of taqlid (to follow someone or to imitate) 
.Under this belief, members are obliged to stage jihad (interpreted as 
physical war) against the “enemy” of Muslim people.  
2. Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) 
The evolution of Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid (partisans of the oneness 
of God) or JAT is also closely associated with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. After he 
left Majelis Mujahedin Indonesia (MUI) in 2006 due to some leadership 
tussles, Ba’asyir continued to find a suitable platform to expand its 
support base. He decided to resign as MUI’s Amir (supreme leader) citing 
the secular nature of the movement. However, fellow leaders of MUI 
accused Ba’asyir of having been a leader with authoritarian style and 
problems of infallibility and accountability. Baa’syir, in turn, knew that he 
could no longer afford to be associated with JI since firstly, JI was in the 
process of disintegrating, secondly, the joint efforts of the Indonesian 
authorities supported by the regional countries and the United States had 
crippled JI’s activities, which resulted in a series of deaths of important JI 
leaders; and finally, the fact that JI was labeled as a terrorist group had 
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diminished its appeals to the Muslims. 
Ba’asyir’s further involvement in JI’s activities could have curtailed 
his mobility, especially after his release from prison. Hence, Ba’asyir left 
with no choice but to set up a new movement. He subsequently 
established JAT in 2008. According to the ICG Report Update, the 
establishment of JAT was welcomed by many members of JI, but clashed 
with the JI leadership over strategy and tactics.43 The movement’s 
membership recruitment was through mass rallies and smaller religious 
instruction sessions in which Ba’asyir and other JAT figures delivered their 
flammable sermons against the West and infidels. Nonetheless, such 
method of recruitment generated subsequent problems to the movement. 
The movement has been heavily dependent on Baa’syir’s spiritual and 
oratorical skills to garner membership, without which it would have 
quickly disintegrated. 44 
In addition, the fact that Baa’syir’s usually flaming and declamatory 
preaching, especially on jihad, has made the movement most appealing to 
disenchanted Indonesian Muslims. He calls for jihad against Islam’s 
enemies but insists it should have stayed within the boundaries of law, yet 
he rejects man-made laws as unlawful. He also “fulminates against 
democracy, contends on a full application of sharia law, and appears to 
advocate a militant interpretation of jihad.”45 
JAT has been listed in the foreign terrorist network of the US for its 
involvement in terrorist-linked activities.46 Prior to the listing, the 
Indonesian police uncovered several JAT’s underground activities. On 6th 
May 2012, for instance, JAT’s headquarters in Jakarta was raided after tips 
were directed towards JAT leaders’ involvement in raising funds for a 
militant combat training camp uncovered in Aceh. JAT was also accused of 
other illicit activities and bank robbery to fund its purchase of assault 
weapons, pistols and bomb-making materials. The movement was said to 
act as a mastermind for terrorist-linked incidents such as the suicide bomb 
attracts at a church in Central Java in September 2011. The Indonesian 
police also uncovered other additional suicide plots by the movement 
across the country.  
The incidents led to the arrest of Ba’asyir. He was later charged with 
crimes of inciting others to commit terrorism, which carries a death 
penalty upon conviction. On 16th June 2011, however, he was sentenced to 
15-years imprisonment for his involvement in the setting up of Acehnese 
jihadi combat camp. 
3. Ḥizb at-Taḥrīr (HT)  
Ḥizb at-Taḥrīr (Party of Liberation) was founded in 1953 in Jerusalem 
by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani (1909-1977), an Islamic scholar and Muslim court 
of appeal judge (Qadi). Al-Nabhan was replaced by Abd al-Qadim Zallum, a 
Palestinian cleric, upon his death. In 2003, the movement appointed a new 
Kamarulnizam Abdullah, Mohd Afandi Salleh Conceptualizing Jihad 
 
Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, vol. 14, issue 42 (Winter 2015)  14 
 
leader, Ata Khalil Abu-Rashta, a Palestinian civil engineer, when Zallum 
passed away in Lebanon. The movement considers itself a trans-Islamic 
Sunni political party with more than one million memberships from 40 
branches all over the world. It has made its presence known on the 
European continent particularly in the United Kingdom. Its Arab, Central 
Asian and United Kingdom branches are considered to be the most active 
despite some of them having been banned by the host governments, for 
instance by the Pakistani authorities. The movement also has a growing 
presence in North America, known as Ḥizb at-Taḥrīr America. 47 
In Southeast Asia, the movement has been established since the 1980s 
but it is only for the last five years that it has made its presence felt with 
various activities targeting the urban middle class and university students. 
It has its own website in Malaysia (www.mykhilafah.com) and Indonesia 
(hizbut-tahrir.or.id/).48 So far, the movement has not been banned by the 
two governments. In fact, Indonesia was the first regional host for the 
annual HT’s annual conference known as the International Khilafah 
Conference which was held on August 12, 2007 in Jakarta. It was advertised 
as the largest gathering of the movement, thus attracting more than 
100,000 people. Hence, it was argued that the movement would remain a 
source of powerful critique of the Indonesian regime.49 The Malaysian 
branch of the movement, however, appears to take a low key profile with 
their activities. 
According to its UK official website, HT’s main objective, among 
others, is to establish a community that could emulate the style and 
qualities of the companions of Muhammad. Those who subscribe to the 
movement are required to show their commitment and to be “ready to 
work to fulfill these goals”. Yet the most interesting goal of the movement 
is to expand the idea of the caliphate and other important Islamic 
concepts to the Muslim masses. Its aim is to glorify and to revive the 
Islamic civilization through the leadership of a caliphate system. Once the 
idea of a caliphate system is accepted, either through debate or 
persuasion, in a ”targeted country”, the movement envisage that it would 
get support and cooperation from army generals, leaders, and other 
influential figures or organisations to facilitate the change of the 
government. The government “would be replaced by one that implements 
Islam "generally and comprehensively", carrying Islamic thought to 
people throughout the world”. 
Hence, a move towards a creation of a world system with that of the 
caliphate is the corner stone of HT’s long term objective. Khalifah is 
considered the head of state and ummah. Furthermore, 
He is not a king or dictator but an elected leader 
whose authority to rule must be given willingly by 
the Muslims through a special ruling contact called 
baya. Without this baya he cannot be the head of 
state. This is completely opposite to a king or 
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dictator who imposes his authority through 
coercion and force. It argues the tyrant kings and 
dictators in the Muslim world are examples of this, 
imprisoning and torturing their populations and 
stealing their wealth and resources.50 
The movement believes all Muslim countries should be unified under 
one Islamic state or caliphate ruled by Islamic law and with a caliph head 
of state elected by Muslims. The caliphate system is believed to provide 
stability and security to both Muslims and Non-Muslims in the 
predominantly Muslim regions of the world. The system would consist of 
sharia as the highest law of the land. But its idea of Khalifah is not 
conceptually similar to that of Jamal-Al-Din Afghani’s, a political activist 
and advocate in the late 19th century. Afghani’s Khalifah of pan-Islamism 
advocates close relations among Muslim ummah to achieve common 
objectives under one leadership. HT’s idea of Khalifah, on the other hand, 
is to emulate the early Islam political system under Prophet Muhammad 
and the four caliphs.51 
The movement’s political belief and ideology are very much 
influenced by the works of Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, its founding leader. 
Nabhani’s works have been translated into various languages and posted 
on nearly all websites of the local host Ḥizb at-Taḥrīr. In his book entitled 
The System of Islam, which has become one of the major references for all 
HT members, an-Nabhani states, 
If not for the influence of the deceptive Western 
culture and the oppression of its agents that will 
soon vanish, then the return to the domain of Islam 
in its ideology and system would be quicker than 
the blink of an eye.52 
Furthermore, in Indonesia and Malaysia, Nabhani’s books such as 
Daulah Islam (Islamic State) and Konsepsi Politik Hizbut Tahrir (Ḥizb at-
Taḥrīr’s Concept of Politics) have been translated and posted on the 
movement’s local websites. 
Nonetheless, it is HT’s anti-Zionist sentiments that have caught the 
attention of the international community. It denounces Israel as an 
"illegal entity" to be dismantled. The problem for the Muslim community, 
the movement argues, is that they do not have a strong and unified 
leadership that could confront Israel and its major ally, the United States. 
The movement acknowledges that Muslims are reaching a state of total 
submission and dejection and fail to respond to anything even when they 
have been intimidated by the infidels. Hence, the movement calls for jihad 
as a unifying rallying point for Muslims to rise up against the injustice and 
discrimination. 
In addition, HT appears to reject the Western concept of democracy. 
In its Indonesia’s website, the movement states that Muslims are obliged 
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to abolish the Western concept of democracy since it is haram 
(forbidden).53 Western democracy is considered like profane elements that 
need to be cleaned. In Islam, according to Ḥizb at-Taḥrīr’s interpretation, 
elections are held only to elect members to Shura Council, which in turn 
would elect the right caliphate. The function of the caliphate, according to 
Interviewee A who refused to be identified and who is one of the 
committee members of the HT Indonesia is not to formulate laws (tasyri’ 
function), but to implement it, based on the holy Quran and Hadith.54 
Hence it is not surprising when Sinclair argues that the movement’s basic 
ideology is,  
to overthrow existing governments in Muslim 
majority countries in order to establish the 
Caliphate which, it is believed, should be done 
through convincing the masses of the superiority of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology and vision for the 
caliphate as well as influencing people already in 
power in Muslim countries.55  
The analysis was further expounded by Baran by arguing that the 
movement is not only promoting political violence but that it also “… acts 
as a "conveyor belt for young Muslims, using its legal status to 
indoctrinate them before they leave the group to join more extreme 
groups that may engage in violence”. 56  
Although HT has so far refrained itself from being involved in terror 
activities, its radical ideologies are the major cause of concern for the 
authorities. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 incidents, for 
instance, HT issued a statement rejecting the use of aggression against 
civilian non-combatants. Yet, International intelligentsia blamed HT for 
the suicide bombing incident in the Tel Aviv bar in 2002 by a United 
Kingdom national known as Omar Shariff, reportedly the first UK suicide 
bomber. It is alleged that Shariff was radicalized by HT’s religious 
activities. The movement was also linked to the London Underground 
Bombings in July 2005. In Pakistan, the links between senior army officers 
with local HT led General Musharraf to outlaw the movement in 2003. The 
Pakistani authorities also believed there was a link between al-Qaeda and 
HT. 
Jihad in the Minds of Radical Salafis: The Nexuses 
There are some observations that can be made when analyzing the 
three movements’ conception on jihad. The three movements share the 
same characteristics of radical salafis discussed earlier in this article: 
firstly, advocating unconditional use of force to achieve a true Islamic 
social and political society based on sharia law. Secondly, these radical 
Salafi movements translate in a literal manner and interpret the holy 
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Quran and hadith to justify their actions. The movements fail to interpret 
the holy book based on its contextual analysis and historical 
circumstances. Hence, they understand the text only from its initial value 
meanings. Thirdly, the movements vehemently reject the secular notion 
of societal life. Islam is seen as ad deen wadunniah, thus advocating total 
infusion between private and public domain. Moreover, the movements do 
not believe in religious freedom, the conversion to other religions being 
intolerable. Fourthly, these radical Salafi movements consider jihad the 
sixth pillar of Islamic belief. It is every Muslim’s obligation to achieve the 
four objectives mentioned above through offensive jihad. Finally, they 
tend to condone terrorist acts especially against the West and Jews.  
In addition, the leadership and idiosyncrasy of leaders plays a crucial 
role in the Salafi movements. Baa’syir of JI and JAT and Nabhani of HT are 
considered the ideological godfathers of their movements. The leader of 
the movement usually needs the charisma and charm that could attract 
ordinary people to join the movement. Such a movement can attract more 
members if the leader himself is perceived as having respected religious 
credentials. This kind of respect would usually lead to total and blind 
loyalty towards the leader. The implication is that the leader usually seizes 
the opportunity to achieve and attain his personal interest.57 It can be 
argued that be it JI, JAT or HT, the movements’ conception on jihad has 
been a reflection of their leader political perception against the status quo. 
Their ways of advocating and of conceptualizing jihad can be 
summarized as follow: 
 
a. Jihad as qital (physical war) 
Jihad has been conceptualized as qital (war), a total physical warfare 
against the enemies of Islam and infidels. These radical salafis have a view 
that there has always been a kafir (infidel) hostility against the Muslims. 
Muslims, as the radical salafis believe, have been colonized physically and 
spiritually by the Western infidels, who have led the world into socio-
political quandaries. Hence it is always a universal legal duty for all 
Muslims to defend their rights. JAT for instance, strongly argues that, 
the Shari’a of Islam obliges us to maintain the five 
things, which are dharuriyah (primary), then the 
things which are of necessity in nature / additional 
hajiyah (secondary), only then for the last are the 
things which are tahsiniyah (supplementary) in 
nature / entirely decorative is haram – once again, 
haram, for the Muslims to remain silent when the 
honour (muru’ah) and dignity of the highness of 
Islam are mocked! If those acts of the Mujahids of 
Islam, in defending the honor, dignity and blood of 
the Muslims from the atrocities of the kuffar 
invaders, are classified as terrorism, while those 
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kuffar leaders are affixed with brotherhood, in fact 
even considered as guests of honor of the State 
when coming to visit, by the leaders of Muslim 
countries, so we aks: “What model of barbaric world 
civilization are you defending and protecting with the 
wealth and the people of the Muslim countries, O 
leaders…? 58 
As for the JI, the concept of salifus soleh was the corner stone of its 
jihadi call. The concept allows the declaration of jihad (by emphasizing the 
physical war side of the concept) not only against the Western powers, but 
also against Muslims who reject the Salafi philosophy of jihad. 
Furthermore, the concept also rejects the traditional understanding of the 
Islamic teachings, which is an infusion of religious teachings with local 
values and norms. The concept accepts only the Quran and Hadith as the 
main sources of Islamic practices. 
For the Indonesian HT, mobilizing its members for jihad has been 
clearly spelled out in Article 56 of its draft constitution. It states that it is 
an individual duty for every Muslim to be conscripted as part of the Jihadi 
forces. “Every male Muslim, fifteen years and over, is obliged to undergo 
military training in readiness for jihad." Furthermore, the Khalifah would 
appoint the Amir al-Jihad (commander-in-chief) to head and supervise “the 
army, the police, equipment, tasks, armament supplies, internal security, 
foreign affairs, and finally industry” — since "all factories of whatever 
type should be established on the basis of the military policy."59 
There is a strong conviction among these radical Salafis that world 
politics is a land of war and that it is divided between the Darul Islam 
(Abode of Muslim) and Darul Harb (Abode of War). HT’s conception of jihad 
is based on these classifications.  
According to Houriya and Stuart, HT believes that its idea of an 
Islamic state, which is governed by Sharia, can wage war to annex all 
Muslim-majority countries as well as to colonize non-Muslim countries. 
HT believes that Muslims should engage in this war to convert all ‘lands of 
war’ into the ‘land of Islam’ through offensive warfare.60 Killing civilians to 
achieve this is allowed. It believes that Muslims have a “religious” duty to 
liberate perceived ‘occupied Islamic lands’.61 Furthermore, HT also 
believes that “terrorizing” the “enemy” is a religious duty against those 
committing “aggression against the sanctities of the Muslims”. 62 The idea 
is actually part of Indonesia HT’s profess and struggle. 63 
 
b. Jihad as a Force for Political Mobilization 
The focus point of the jihadi call for these radical Salafis is the United 
States and its loyal ally, Israel. International injustice, the allegedly blind 
support of the United States towards Israel, and its involvement in the 
current political turmoil in the Middle East are viewed by many radical 
Salafi movements as recipes for a continuous flourishing of terrorist 
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attacks and activities.64 The International Khalifah Conference of the 
Indonesian HT, which took place in Jakarta in 2007, openly condemned 
Zionism and the creation of Israel. The annual conference stirred high 
emotion among the attendees "…into a frenzy ... by calling for a war on 
Jews.65 The crux of this hatred and accusation lies on displeasure of such 
movements over the 50-year conflict between Palestinian and Israel. 
Israel is perceived to be the number one enemy of HT’s jihadi call.66 
The state has to be destroyed by whatever means, and killing Israeli Jews 
is believed to be sanctioned by Islam.67 To achieve this, HT prescribes 
violent jihad, which includes suicide bombings as well as hijacking and 
bombing Israeli planes. 
JI and JAT also share the same sentiment with HT. Baa’syir argued 
that he “… supported Osama Bin Laden's struggle because his is the true 
struggle to uphold Islam, not terror. The terrorists are America and 
Israel.68 He also believed in “Osama bin Laden's struggle because his is the 
true struggle to uphold Islam." Furthermore, Baa’syir also made a 
controversial statement which he delivered upon his release in East Java 
in 2006: “God willing, there are none here, if there were infidels here, just 
beat them up. Do not tolerate them”. This portrayed his deadly actions 
against Australia, another  ally of the US.69 
The death of Osama, furthermore, would garner widespread 
sympathy from radical Salafi movements in the region, particularly to JI 
and JAT that have been inspired by al-Qaeda’s bold and confrontational 
approach towards major powers. In fact, Osama bin Laden has become a 
powerful mythic icon for impatient, alienated, and angry radical salafis. It 
can be argued that Osama bin Laden has, perhaps, revolutionized some 
Muslims’ responses to what they perceive as being international injustice 
and American hegemony. 
 
c. Localization of Jihad 
Jihad among these three radical Salafis has also been used for 
localized context. Some international issues were localized to garner 
support and to mobilize Muslim sentiment against an incident that 
deemed insulting to Islam. Baa’syir, for instance, sent a stern warning that 
the movement would, 
…declare war to those who dare to create an 
insult to the Prophet Muhammad and fail to 
immediately stop such actions. Our reprisal is based 
on the provisions of sharia Islam. We consider that 
only death penalty alone shall be made for those 
who do insult to the Prophet Muhammad.70 
His harsh statement was a reaction towards a cartoon depicting the 
Prophet Muhammad with a bomb-shaped turban drawn by a Danish 
cartoonist, Kurt Westergaard. The caricature of the Prophet Muhammad 
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also outraged the Muslims world. 
JAT and JI also worked closely with other locally based radical groups 
such as Laskar Jihad and Front Pembebasan Islam (FPI). Hence, it is not 
surprising when FPI’s involvement and action in the Pontianak incident 
on March 2012, received wide support from JAT, especially when its 
leader, Ali Al Muntahar, argued that FPI’s actions “is a part of the Islamic 
ummah, those who disturb the FPI, it means they are disturbing the Islamic 
ummah... the Muslims do not attack, but they are attacked first!"71 
Conclusion 
Jihad has become a fluid concept under the current modern history. 
Throughout the centuries, the jihad conception, with its sense of fighting 
or struggle – has undergone various changes in content, application and 
argument in order to adjust to the contemporary world. One may argue 
that jihad is an in-built character of every Muslim. Jihad should be viewed 
as Muslims’ strive for inner strength. Yet, it has been jihad, as a holy war 
that has been emphasized in many years. Since the rise of Taliban and 
subsequently al-Qaeda, as alternative yet important political forces in the 
international system, the concept of jihad has undergone another 
transformation of ideas, meanings and theories. Jihad has been viewed 
from the qital (war) perspective, which emphasizes physical war against 
the non-believers. Ironically, however, the qital conception of jihad has 
further been expanded to include war against fellow Muslims who deemed 
to be associated with the non-believers. It can be argued that the 
contemporary concept of jihad inclines to have a heavy political baggage.  
In Southeast Asia, the talibanization and the influence of the al-Qaeda 
interpretation of the jihad appear to have made their inroad in regional 
radical salafi movements such as the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Jama’ah 
Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), and Ḥizb at-Taḥrīr (HT). The interpretation and 
the conceptualization of jihad for these regional Salafi movements appear 
to be closely associated with the qital ideas. Furthermore, the jihadi calls 
are aimed to political mobilization against the perceived domination of 
Western powers, particularly the United States and its allies.  
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